We revisit the concept of intensionality and its relevance for computer science, as well as the ways in which 'intension' can be turned into a logical construct. We describe the need for bicategories in that endeavour. Then, inspired by the categorical semantics of modal logic, we introduce exposures, a new 2-categorical construct that is meant to abstractly capture intensional constructions, e.g. Gödel numberings. In our new framework, the classic results of Kleene, Gödel, Tarski, and Rice are very simple to reproduce. Moreover, it is easy to isolate the expressive power required to reproduce them.
Introduction
This paper is a first attempt to create a categorical framework that captures two somehow elusive notions, those of intensionality, and intensional recursion.
Intensionality
Intensionality is a notion that dates as early as Frege's philosophical distinction between sense and denotation, see for example [18] . In the most mathematically general sense, to be 'intensional' is to somehow operate at a level finer than some predetermined 'extensional' equality. Intensionality is ominpresent in constructive mathematics, where the question of equality is nontrivial (see e.g. [8] ). For example, two different sequences of rationals may stand for the same real number: they may be extensionally equal, yet intensionally distinct.
Within mainstream mathematics, intensionality is merely a nuisance, so common set theories assume some axiom of extensionality, and functions are identified with their graphs. Glimpses of intensionality appear very rarely, and usually only only because someone is trying to prove some extensionality axiom independent from the rest of some theory (see e.g. [43] for a recent example).
However, there is a lot of intensionality in computer science. It would be fair to say that many branches of computer science [Copyright notice will appear here once 'preprint' option is removed.] are in essence the study of computer programs, seen under some appropriate notion of equality.
At one end of the spectrum, correctness of programs is discussed in the context of some relation of observational equivalence, i.e. indistinguishability of programs. Intermediately, complexity theory requires a slightly stronger notion, which we could call complexity equivalence: this is observational equivalence, strengthened by some account of the resources the program consumes. At the other extreme, computer viruses may make decisions based strictly on patterns of object code they encounter, disregarding the actual function of what they are infecting; one could say they operate up to α-equivalence, i.e. syntactic identity. Each of the aforementioned notions of equality is more intensional than the one preceding it, and all these levels are interesting for different purposes.
Intensionality as a Logical Construct
We are primarily interested in creating a framework where constructions can be observed in two ways: as black boxes, i.e. extensionally, whatever we define that to mean; and as white boxes, i.e. intensionally, which should amount to being able to 'look inside' a construction and examine its internal workings. This amounts to being able to disregard extensional concerns entirely.
The reasons for pursuing this are many and subtle. A main concern is the ability to reduce non-functional computation to functional. By non-functional computation in this context we do not simply mean computational with side effects: this has been very effectively modelled using game semantics, see e.g. [2, 3] . In contrast, we are interested in an somewhat murkier sense of higherorder computation that operates 'on syntax.' For example, it is a well-known fact in higher-order computability that there is no modulus of continuity functional in an extensional, side-effect free language, but that it is definable with some effects (see, for example, Andrej Bauer's blog [7] ). Both the choice of effect that allows this kind of functional to be computed and its logical underpinnings are studied in an ad-hoc manner; see e.g. [31, §6] . Our goal is to provide a very general way to add 'intensional' features to a programming language, violating neither extensionality nor freedom from side effects.
How shall we achieve that? The plan is this: it should not take more than a mere type constructor to pass from the extensional 'world' to the intensional 'world.'
Previous attempts
In this endeavour, one has to proceed with care, for it is easy to collapse everything in the process. A pained example is that of reflection in programming languages, in the sense of Brian Cantwell Smith [40] . A reflective program is by design always able to obtain a complete description of its source code and current state, so that it can reflect upon itself. In the context of untyped λ-calculus, Barendregt [6] showed that assuming a 'self-quote' term Q such that QM = β M , where M is the Gödel number of M , makes the βη theory inconsistent. In a more involved example, Wand [45] showed that adding a slightly more powerful reflective construct as a primitive-one which, when applied to a term, reduces to its encoding as higher-order abstract syntax 1 -collapses observational equivalence to α-equivalence, hence making reasoning about programs rather more complicated. In a typed setting, it is not hard to see that any language in the style of Longley's PCF+quote [28] also suffers from similar problems.
In fact, the only workable proposal rests on cleanly separating extension from intension, so that the former does not 'leak' into the latter. We shall achieve this using types, and, in particular, modal types. It was first suggested by Davies and Pfenning [17, 38] that modal types may be used to separate intension from extension. Indeed, in op. cit. they constructed a λ-calculus loosely corresponding to S4 modal logic under the Curry-Howard isomorphism, in which they embedded a two-level λ-calculus. Even though their concerns are metaprogramming and binding time analysis, in passing they interpret the modal type A as the type of 'intensions of type A' or 'codes of type A.' In the conclusion of [38] , the authors recognize that 'intension' is not preserved under reduction, and thus, when evaluating a term box M : A there should be no reductions under the box construct. These intuitions were further elaborated into a fully-fledged dependent type theory by Pfenning [37] .
Trouble in Paradise
All is well with the above, apart from the fact that the available semantics are in sharp dissonance with it. The categorical semantics of S4-like modal λ-calculi, due to Bierman and de Paiva [10] and Kobayashi [24] , specify that is a monoidal comonad ( , ǫ, δ) on a CCC. The counit ǫA : A → A may be understood as an internal interpreter or evaluator, turning code into values. The comultiplication, δA : A → A may be understood as 'quoting,' but quoting that we can only use once our value is code to start with. The problem now becomes obvious: equality in the underlying category is the extensional equality in this context, so a = b in the category implies (a) = (b). This automatically means that M = N : A implies box M = box N : A, which is not what we mean by intensionality at all. Even worse, under very reasonable assumptions (that will actually hold in our examples), we can build an isomorphism between points 1 → A and points 1 → A, for any A: that means that there are as many 'codes' or 'expressions' of type A as there are 'values' of type A, which is once more not what we mean by intensionality.
The main thesis of this paper is that, by introducing separate notions of equality, the extensional equality ∼ =, and the intensional equality ≈, we can salvage the above ideas from modal logic, as well as the interpretation of the necessity modality as 'intension.' Nevertheless, having two notions of equality necessitates, as we shall see, that we pass from ordinary categories to bicategories (weak 2-categories). Fragments of this idea have appeared before, under the name of E-categories and P-categories. The former are bicategories whose hom-categories are equivalence relations, and were studied by Kinoshita [21] . The latter are 'categories' whose hom-sets are equipped with a partial equivalence relation (PER), and the axioms of a category hold only 'up to the PER'; these were studied by Cubric, Dybjer and Scott [15] .
Intensional Recursion
Once we have developed a framework where we can speak about intensions, then we may speak of a strange phenomenon that originates in computability theory, that of intensional recursion.
In virtually all programming languages, we use extensional recursion: in the body of a function, we are allowed to call the function we are defining a finite number of times, and therefore only observe its values at a finite set of arguments. Very roughly, this corresponds to Kleene's First Recursion Theorem (FRT). Theorem 1 (First Recursion Theorem [23] ). Let P be complete partial order of unary partial functions. Then, every effectively continuous functional 2 F : P → P has a least fixed point f : N ⇀ N, which is a partial recursive function.
Full definitions and proofs may be found in any of the books of Cutland [16] , Rogers [39] , Odifreddi [35] , or Longley and Normann [29] .
The FRT is one of the pillars of higher-order computability, and its abstract analogue in domain theory is the basis of the semantics of PCF, see [29, 42] . But before the 1950s, the main result that allowed for recursive definitions was the Second Recursion Theorem (SRT), proven by Kleene as a one-liner in 1938 [22] . Let us fix some notation in order to state the SRT. We write ≃ for Kleene equality: if e and e ′ are expressions whose value may be 'undefined', we write e ≃ e ′ if either both are undefined, or both are defined and of equal value. Let φ0, φ1, . . . be an enumeration of the partial recursive functions. This enumeration has to be acceptable, 3 which means that it needs to satisfy some very reasonable conditions that are almost trivial for most programming languages. To obtain a recursive definition is the usual one in the λcalculus: we write a 'blueprint function' f (e, y), one of which will be the 'code' of the definiendum, and y will be the argument provided at runtime. Then, using the SRT, we obtain a function φe, which has access to its own code. This is far more general than the FRT, as f (e, y) can make arbitrary decisions depending on the source code e, irrespective of which function φe happens to be. In contrast, effectively continuous functionals had to respect that. In fact, the Myhill-Shepherdson theorem [16, 34] ensures that effectively continuous functionals (to which the FRT applies) exactly correspond to partial recursive functions f : N × N ⇀ N that satisfy
i.e. the f (e, y) such that e is treated extensionally.
But even if we limit ourselves to extensional definitions of f (e, y), the SRT grants us more power. For example, before recursively calling e on some points, f (e, y) could 'optimize' e depending on what y is, hence ensuring that the recursive call will run faster than e itself would. This line of thought is common in the partial evaluation community (see e.g. [19] ).
The SRT has numerous applications in theory, a dizzying array of which were collected in one place by Moschovakis [33] . However, it is deafeningly absent in computer science. Abramsky has ardently suggested further investigation, likening the SRT to "the dog that didn't bark" in the Sherlock Holmes story, and has discussed several related issues in [1] . The present author has also extensively discussed the two recursion theorems and the relationship between them in [20] .
The second contribution of this paper is that, armed with the framework for intensionality discussed in the previous section, we can immediately define what intensional recursion is, and prove fixpoint theorems that guarantee it.
Prospectus
The roadmap for the rest of the paper is as follows.
To start, we shall briefly introduce bicategories and explain why they are useful in modelling intensionality. Then, we shall introduce the notion of an exposure, a novel 2-categorical construct that, by and large, 'turns intensions into extensions.'
Following that, we shall finally define what we mean by intensional recursion-in terms of exposures-and state a simple fixed point theorem for intensional recursion. We shall argue that this is a generalization of Kleene's Second Recursion Theorem by constructing a bicategory and an exposure based on realizability, which is such that the theorem specializes to the SRT in that particular category.
We then turn to the discussion of 'truth values' and notions of consistency in abstract. Our framework allows us to prove abstract analogues of three famous theorems, namely Tarski's undefinability theorem, Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem, and Rice's Theorem. Whereas the last one is substantiated in the same category as before, the other two are best seen through the lens of another bicategory, this time based on Peano Arithmetic.
Bicategories and Intensionality
Suppose we have a model of computation or a programming language whose instances of programs are understood to compute functions, e.g. Turing machines, λ-calculus, or a pure functional language. Suppose, then, that we are able to compose programs in this language, so that from programs P (computing f ) and Q (computing g) there is a simple syntactic construction Q; P (computing g • f ).
In more elegant cases, like the λ-calculus, composition will essentially be substitution for a free variable. But in anything reasonably more complicated composition will involve some unappetizing overhead. For example, in the case of Turing machines, this might involve taking some disjoint union of sets of states that involves appropriate 'tags.' This syntactic overhead almost always ensures that composition of programs is not associative: (R; Q); P is not syntacticallly identical to R; (Q; P), even though they compute the same function. This is exactly why bicategories (or weak 2-categories) are necessary. Bicategories, which we generally denote B, C, . . . , are 'categories' whose "hom-objects" are no longer sets, but categories: for any two objects A, B ∈ B, there is a hom-category B(A, B). The objects of B(A, B) are 1-cells, f : A → B (formerly arrows), and between any two 1-cells f, g : A → B, there can be 2-cells, which we denote α : f ⇒ g. Everything is held together by postulating that the axioms of categories hold up to invertible 2-cells, and not on-the-nose as in 1-category theory. As a rule of thumb, to obtain the 2-categorical version of any 1-categorical concept, it suffices to postulate a natural equivalence of hom-categories whenever we would ordinarily ask for a natural isomorphism of homsets. Unfortunately, we cannot expound on bicategories any further, but we recommend [9, 12, 26] .
Bicategories, then, are indispensible for modelling the disparity between intensionality and extensionality: both 1-categories and (strict) 2-categories require that composition be associative, hence are unsuited to the purpose. On the contrary, in a bicategory we may regard 1-cells f : A → B as intensional (e.g. programs). Extensional equality can be defined to be isomorphism of 1-cells in the appropriate hom-category. To wit,
In that case, we write
At the level of ∼ =, we regain the standard equations of 1-category theory. For example, the various 2-cells required in the definition of bicategories guarantee that
Furthermore, recalling that composition also a functor on homcategories, and given α : f ⇒ g for f, g : A → B, we can whisker α and another 1-cell h : B → C, to obtain
Hence, we are largely able to use ∼ = to calculate isomorphisms between 1-cells quite liberally, as if we are in a standard 1-categorical setting.
Exposures
As we can now differentiate between intensional and extensional equality, we can formulate a categorical contraption that allows us to "white-box" a 1-cell, so as to make its 'internal structure' visible. This new concept we call an exposure.
such that
• the functorial laws concerning 1-cells are satisfied on the nose; that is,
Notice that we do not require that exposures preserves the structure of the hom-category, or even any 2-cells at all. One may think of Q as 'exposing' some underlying, intensional structure of 0-cells and 1-cells. However, it is reasonable that, once α : Qf ⇒ Qg, i.e. we can 'intensionally deform f to g,' then it should be the case that there is some Q −1 α : f ⇒ g to match that, in a compatible way. That the functorial laws hold strictly is not etched on tablets of stone.
The identity exposure Id B : B B maps every object to itself, and every 1-cell to itself. Finally, it is easy to see that Lemma 1. The composite of two exposures is an exposure.
Intensional Equality
Extensional equality of 1-cells ( ∼ =) aside, one obvious candidate for intensional equality in our development so far is actually strict equality (=) of 1-cells. This seems to be far too fine for our purposes, as our main examples will shortly reveal. It is also logically uninteresting, because the theory of bicategories does not postulate any strict equalities, so we cannot infer anything without making additional, non-categorical assumptions about a specific bicategory.
However, using exposures, we can define an intermediate intensional equality of 1-cells. This also allows us to possibly postulate extra equalities in future development.
In that case, we write f ≈ g This is an exact interpretation of the slogan of Abramsky [1] : intensions become extensions, in the sense that we reduce intensional equality to extensional equality, but only after exposing the implementation.
By the definition of exposures, if f ≈ g, we have 2-cells
Intensional equality implies extensional equality.
Transforming between exposures
Observe that our definition exactly mirrors that of a 2-transformation, but excluding preservation or coherence of 2-cells.
Monoidal Exposures
Let B, C be bicategories with cartesian products. These are as one would expect, and their definition can be reached by expressing cartesian products in terms of natural isomorphisms, and then asking for a natural equivalence in their place. Details may be found in Ouaknine [36] .
We shall call exposures monoidal exactly when it 'plays reasonably well' with products in the bicategory. Perhaps it would be more apt to call them 'cartesian,' for the definition resembles that of a strict monoidal functor between two categories with cartesian products, but we would like to reserve the term for other constructions.
Definition 5.
A monoidal exposure (with respect to the product structure) consists of:
Unfortunately, the above definition has to happen in bare metal: given an exposure Q, the obvious construction Q(−) × Q(−) is not necessarily an exposure, so we cannot reuse the definition of transformation of exposures to capture it.
Evaluators, Quotation Devices, Comonadic Exposures
Using transformations of exposures, we may start reinterpreting concepts from the modality-as-intension interpretation.
Suppose that Q is monoidal. Given a point a : 1 → A, its quote is defined to be the point Q(a) • m0 : 1 → QA. Composing with components of an evaluator, we calculate
where the first equality is because ǫ is a transformation, and the second because 1 is a terminal object in the bicategory.
is a reasonable quoting device just if we can fill the following square with an invertible 2-cell:
If δ is a quoter, we have that
where the first equality is because δ is a transformation, the second because δA is a reasonable quoting device, and the third because Q is an exposure.
To put these things together in a reasonable way, we freely borrow from the theory of comonads. • as well as invertible 2-cells, filling in, for each A ∈ B, the following diagrams:
Exposures and Intensional Recursion
Armed with the above, we can now speak both of extensional and intensional recursion. Let us start with what is already well-known.
Extensional Fixed Points
If, for a given object Y , every 1-cell t : Y → Y has a EFP, then we say that Y has EFPs.
Lawvere [25] famously proved a theorem which guarantees that certain objects have EFPs. The main assumption is the following. Proof. Let
Then there exists a x f : 1 → A such that
For reasons that we will discuss in the next section, this is quite clearly an extensional fixed point result. In particular, we do not know of nor can imagine a category where it specializes to Kleene's second recursion theorem. Can something similar be done for intensional fixed points?
Intensional Fixed Points and Löb's Rule
Let us look at the equation φe(y) ≃ f (e, y) again. If we try to write it type-theoretically and curry it a bit, whilst demanding that e be of modal (i.e. intensional) type, say C, then we obtain eval e y = f e y (here eval is term of type C → C for some C, which corresponds to φ, thought of as an enumeration of the partial recursive functions). Let us immediately η-reduce to eval e = f e. Inferring types, we see that we must have f : C → C. Now, let us assume that e = box y for y : C, and consequently that eval e = y. It follows that
Replacing the construct box and with appropriate instances of Q, we arrive at the following. Definition 12. Let Q be a monoidal exposure. An intensional fixed point (IFP) of a 1-cell t : QY → Y is a point y : 1 → Y such that we can fill the following diagram with an invertible 2-cell:
An object A has IFPs (with respect to Q) just if every 1-cell t :
QA → A has a IFP.
This makes intuitive sense: y is extensionally equal to t 'evaluated at the point' Q(y) • m0, which is the 'quoted' version of y.
At this point, we also remark that having IFPs is, in logical terms, the ability to infer A given A → A, which is known as Löb's rule in Provability Logic [4, 11] . We are currently investigating this link in separate work. Now, can we adapt Lawvere's result to IFPs? The answer is positive; it is, in fact, quite straightforward, once we embellish the statement with appropriate occurences of Q. We also need a reasonable quoting device. 
As we shall see in the next section, this is a true categorical analogue of Kleene's SRT.
An Exposure on Assemblies
Our main example of an exposure will come from realizability, where the basic objects are assemblies. An assembly is a set, to every element of which we have associated a set of "realizers." We can view an assembly as a 'datatype,' and the realizers as 'machinelevel' representations of the elements of the datatype. For example, if realizers are natural numbers, and we only pick functions between assemblies which can be computably 'realized,' i.e. are 'implementable' on the level of realizers by a partial recursive function, then we obtain a category where "everything is computable."
In practice, the generalization from natural numbers to an arbitrary partial combinatory algebra (PCA) is made. A PCA is an arbitrary, untyped 'universe' corresponding to some notion of computability and/or relizability. There are easy tricks with which one may encode various common 'first-order' datatypes, such as booleans, integers, etc. Moreover, it is quite simple to show that one may use the representation of integers to represent all partial recursive functions. These can be found in Beeson [8] . Most of them derive from classic encodings in the untyped λ-calculus (see [5] ). General references for PCAs include [30, 32, 44] .
Definition 13.
A partial combinatory algebra (PCA) (A, ·) consists of a set A and a partial binary operation,
As expected, the two combinators K and S suffice for a (rather tricky) version of combinatory completeness for PCAs, a thorough discussion of which may be found in [30] .
The simplest example of a PCA, corresponding to classical computability, is K1, also known as Kleene's first model. Its carrier is N, and r ·a def = φr(a). For any PCA, we write e ↓ to mean that e is a well-defined expression that denotes an element of the carrier in question. E.g, in the PCA K1, r · a ↓ means that φr(a) is defined, and r · a ≃ b means that φr(a) ≃ b.
Definition 14.
An assembly X on a PCA A consists of a set |X| and, for each x ∈ |X|, a non-empty subset x X of A. If a ∈ x X , we say that a realizes x.
Definition 15. For two assemblies X and Y , a function f : |X| → |Y | is said to be tracked by r ∈ A just if, for all x ∈ |X| and a ∈ x X , we have r · a ↓ and r · a ∈ f (x) Y Now: for each PCA A, we can define a category Ass(A), with • objects: all assemblies X on A;
• morphisms: a morphism f : X → Y is a function f : |X| → |Y | that is tracked by some r ∈ A.
Theorem 5. Assemblies and 'trackable' morphisms between them form a category Ass(A) that is cartesian closed, has coproducts, as well as a natural numbers object.
We only mention one other construction that we shall need. Given an assembly X, the lifted assembly X ⊥ is defined to be
for some chosen element of the PCA 0. Elements of X ⊥ are either elements of X ⊥ , or the undefined value ⊥. Realizers of x ∈ |X| are 'computations' r ∈ A which, when run (i.e. given the dummy value 0 as argument), they return a realizer of x. A computation that does not halt when run represents the undefined value. This is but one way to define a lifted assembly. There are many other ways to define what a lifted assembly is, and this is a research topic in its own right [30, 32] . In particular, our chosen definition does not work if the underlying PCA is total, for then the undefined value ⊥ is has no realizers. However, as long as the PCA is nontotal, this definition works. As we are mostly interesting in K1, which is decidedly non-total, this is sufficient for our purposes.
Passing to a bicategory
The lack of intensionality in the category Ass(A) is blatantly obvious. To elevate a function f : |X| → |Y | to a morphism f : X → Y , we only require that there exists a r ∈ A that realizes it: as soon as this is witnessed, we forget about the witness entirely, and f does not 'carry' its own realizer. This is exactly what we wish to mend, by passing to an appropriate bicategory.
The bicategory of assemblies on A, Bass(A) is defined as follows.
• 0-cells: all assemblies X on A.
• For two assemblies X, Y on A, we define the hom-category
where r tracks f : |X| → |Y |. The identity 1-cell idX :
where I is a combinator in the PCA such that I · x x for all x ∈ A.
2-cells: there is a 2-cell between any two 1-cells just if their function components are equal; that is, we only introduce
Thus there is at most a unique 2-cell between any two 1cells.
• For 1-cells (f, p) : X → Y and (g, q) : Y → Z, we define
where B is a combinator in the PCA such that
for any f, g, x ∈ A. Composition of 2-cells is even easier to define.
It is not hard to check that Bass(A) is a well-defined bicategory, even if slightly degenerate: Bass(A)(X, Y ) is both a preorder and a groupoid, i.e. it is a discrete category: there is at most one 2cell between any two 1-cells, and every such 2-cell is invertible. In fact, Bass(A) is an E-category [21] , but we consider the extra generality beneficial. It is easy yet tedious to painstakingly check that that, in an appropriate sense, Bass(A) is a cartesian closed bicategory. The definition of cartesian closure here is mostly what one would expect, with natural equivalences in the place of erstwhile natural isomorphisms. The exact details have been thoroughly investigated by Ouaknine [36] .
Theorem 6. Bass(A) is a cartesian closed bicategory, and has a natural numbers object N.
The verification is much the same as for Ass(A), but requires care in carrying around realizers along with functions.
We can now define an exposure on this bicategory. The construction goes like this: for an assembly X ∈ Bass(A), let X be the assembly defined by
Each element (x, a) ∈ | X| carries with it its own unique realizer a. The image of (f, r) under Q shows not only what f does to an element of its domain, but also how r acts on the realizer of that element. Notice that 2-cells are trivially reflected.
Kleene's Recursion Theorems, categorically
Let us concentrate on the category Bass(K1), which corresponds to realizability over the partial recursive functions. 1-cells N → N ⊥ are easily seen to correspond to partial recursive functions. It is not hard to produce a weak-point surjection rE : N × N → N N ⊥ , and hence to invoke Lawvere's theorem to show that every arrow N N ⊥ → N N ⊥ has an extensional fixed point. Now, by Longley's generalized Myhill-Shepherdson theorem [29, 30] , arrows N N ⊥ → N N ⊥ correspond to effectively continuous functionals. So, in this context, Lawvere's theorem, corresponds to a simple diagonal argument that yields Kleene's FRT (but does not guarantee that the fixed point obtained is least). Let us look at 1-cells of type (N N ⊥ ) → N N ⊥ . These correspond to 'non-functional' transformations, mapping functions to functions, but without respecting extensionality. As every natural number indexes a partial recursive function, these 1-cells really correspond to all partial recursive functions (up to some tagging and encoding). It is not hard to see that N is equivalent to N, and that one can build a weak-point surjection of type N × N → N N ⊥ , so that by our theorem, every 1-cell of type (N N ⊥ ) → N N ⊥ has an intensional fixed point. This is exactly Kleene's SRT.
We conjecture that the above constructions can be extended to provide a fixpoint of any arrow A → A where A is a simple type, and any arrow A → A as well.
Notions of Consistency, Gödel, Tarski, and Rice
In this section we argue that two well-known theorems from logic can be reduced to very simple algebraic arguments involving exposures. In fact, the gist of both arguments relies on the existence of IFPs for an 'object of truth values' in an appropriate bicategory. The theorems in question are Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem [11, 41] and Tarski's Undefinability Theorem [41] . The setting is very simple. Suppose that we have some sort of 'object of truth values,' for which let us write 2. This does not need to be anything as serious as a subobject classifier. Let us only assume that it has two distinct points, ⊤ : 1 → 2 and ⊥ : 1 → 2, standing for true and false respectively. Let us also assume that there is a 1-cell,
which satisfies ¬ • ⊤ ∼ = ⊥ and ¬ • ⊥ ∼ = ⊤.
Gödel
A simplified version of Gödel's First Incompleteness theorem in the special case for Peano Arithmetic [11] , henceforth denoted simply PA, is this: Theorem 8 (Gödel). If PA is consistent, then there are sentences φ of PA such that neither PA ⊢ φ nor PA ⊢ ¬φ.
The proof relies on two constructions: the diagonal lemma, and the fact that provability is definable in the system. Both involve the notion of a Gödel numbering, i.e. an assignment of a numeral · to each term and formula of PA. The diagonal lemma for PA states that, given any formula φ(x), there exists a closed formula fix(φ) such that PA ⊢ fix(φ) ↔ φ( fix(φ) ) The definability of provability amounts to the fact that there is a formula Prov(x) with one free variable x such that
That is: the system can internally talk about its own provability, modulo some Gödel numbering.
It is not then hard to sketch the proof to Gödel's theorem: take ψ such that PA ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬Prov( ψ ). Then ψ is provable if and only if it is not, so if either PA ⊢ ψ or PA ⊢ ¬ψ that would cause inconsistency. Thus, if PA is consistent, neither ψ or its negation are provable. It follows that ψ is neither equivalent to ⊥ or to ⊤. In a way, ψ is a closed formula that somehow represents eerie truth values other than ⊤ and ⊥.
We shall see by means of a concrete construction in the next section that the diagonal lemma is exactly the existence of IFPs! The provability predicate we can represent as an arrow p : Q2 → 2 such that y ∼ = ⊤ ⇐⇒ p • Q(y) • m0 ∼ = ⊤ Finally, we can capture the meaning of 'consistency' by the following definition: Definition 16. An object 2 as above is simply consistent just if ⊤ ∼ = ⊥.
Armed with this machine, we can transport the argument underlying Gödel's proof to our more abstract setting: Theorem 9. If a p : Q2 → 2 is as above, and 2 has IFPs, then one of the following things is true: either (a) there points of 2 other than ⊤ : 1 → 2 and ⊥ : 1 → 2; or (b) 2 is not simply consistent, i.e. ⊤ ∼ = ⊥.
Proof. As 2 has IFPs, take y : 1 → 2 such that y ∼ = ¬ • p • Q(y) • m0. Now, if y ∼ = ⊤, then by the property of p above, p•Q(y)•m0 ∼ = ⊤, hence ¬•p•Q(y)•m0 ∼ = ⊥, hence y ∼ = ⊥. So either y ∼ = ⊤ or 2 is not simply consistent. Similarly, either y ∼ = ⊥ or 2 is not simply consistent.
Tarski
Tarski's Undefinability Theorem is the result that truth cannot be defined in arithmetic [41] .
Theorem 10 (Tarski). If PA is consistent, then there is no predicate True(x) such that
for all sentences φ.
That is: we cannot obtain the 'truth value' of a sentence of arithmetic simply by examining its Gödel number within arithmetic itself. The proof is simple: use the diagonal lemma to obtain a closed ψ such that PA ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬True( ψ ), so that PA ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬ψ, which leads to inconsistency. Now, if the diagonal lemma is the existence of IFPs for 2, then it is not hard to see that Tarski's 'truth predicate' really is the existence of an evaluator ǫ : Q • Id B . This will become obvious in the following section.
In proving Tarski's theorem, we constructed a sentence ψ such that PA ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬ψ. This can be captured abstractly by the following definition. Definition 17. An object 2 as above is fix-consistent just if the 1cell ¬ : 2 → 2 has no EFP; that is, there is no y : 1 → 2 such that ¬ • y ∼ = y.
The final observation which yields Tarski's theorem in our abstract setting is this: 
where the second equality holds because ǫ is an evaluator, and the third holds because 1 is terminal.
Hence, Theorem 11. If 2 has IFPs in the presence of an evaluator, then it is not fix-consistent.
Rice
Rice's theorem, a discussion of which may be found in [16] , is a result in computability theory which states that we cannot decide any non-trivial property of a program simply by looking at its code. A short proof relies on applying Kleene's Second Recursion Theorem.
Theorem 12 (Rice). Let F be a non-trivial set of partial recursive functinos, and let AF def = { e ∈ N | φe ∈ F } be the set of indices of functions in that set. Then AF is undecidable.
Proof. Suppose AF is decidable. The fact F is non-trivial means that there is some a ∈ N such that φa ∈ F and some b ∈ N such that φ b ∈ F. Consequently, a ∈ AF and b ∈ AF . Define
, so that φe ∈ F, a contradiction. A similar phenomenon occurs if e ∈ AF . Now, how can we reproduce this abstract? Constructing f in the proof required two basic elements: (a) the ability to evaluate either φa or φ b given a and b;(b) the ability to decide which one to use depending on the input; and (c) intensional recursion. For (a), we shall need evaluators, for (b) we shall need that the truth object 2 is a weak coproduct of two copies of 1, so that we can define arrows out of it, and for (c) we shall require IFPs.
We remarked in the previous subsection that the combination of evaluators and IFPs yields fix-inconsistency. This can be justified in the usual computational manner: since there are EFPs, there are some 'undefined' values, including some y such that ¬ • y ∼ = y. Theorem 13. Let 2 is a simply consistent 'truth object' which also happens to be a a weak coproduct of two copies of 1, with injections ⊤ : 1 → 2 and ⊥ : 1 → 2. Furthermore, suppose that A have EFPs. Suppose f : A → 2 is such that for any x :
In the first case, we can calculate that
This argument is an abstract version of Rice's Theorem, and the premises are easily satisfied in our exposure on assemblies from the previous section. Indeed, if if we take A = N ⊥ N and 2 to be the lifted coproduct (1 + 1) ⊥ .
An Exposure on Arithmetic
We will now turn the handle on everything that we discussed in the preceding section, by describing the construction of a bicategory based on a single-sorted first order theory. Our construction is very similar to that of Lawvere [25] , and we will also mirror his terminology in calling it the Lindenbaum bicategory of the theory.
The full construction is tedious, so we will only sketch it. Furthermore, since our intended applications inevitably lead us to it, we will be implicitly thinking of a very special single-sorted firstorder theory, that of Peano Arithmetic, henceforth denoted PA. More about PA may be found in [11, 41] . However, the thesis of this section is quite general: no matter which theory underlies the bicategory, the concept of exposure on this bicategory abstractly captures the notion of a Gödel 'numbering' on this theory. Now to the construction. Let there be a single-sorted first-order theory T. The objects of the category are the formal products of (a) 1, the terminal object, (b) A, the domain, and (c) 2, the object of truth values. One can then loosely think of 1-cells 1 → A and A → A as terms with no or one free variable respectively; 1-cells A n → 2 and 1 → 2 as predicates, with n and no free variables respectively; and 1-cells 2 n → 2 as logical connectives (e.g. ∧ : 2 × 2 → 2).
Given two 1-cells s, t with codomain A, i.e. two terms, there is an invertible 2-cell between them if and only if T ⊢ s = t. Regarding 1-cells φ, ψ with codomain 2, we have a choice: we can introduce a 2-cell α : φ ⇒ ψ whenever T ⊢ φ → ψ (or even to stand for a particular derivation of that). Alternatively, we may introduce an invertible 2-cell just if T ⊢ φ ↔ ψ.
To define an exposure, it suffices to have a Gödel 'numbering', i.e. a representation of terms and formulas of the theory as elements of its domain A. More precisely, we need a Gödel 'numbering' for which substitution is internally definable. Write φ(x1, . . . , xn) and t(a1, . . . , am) for the Gödel 'numbers' of the formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) and the term t(a1, . . . , am) respectively. We assume the Gödel numbering is injective. Details of such constructions for T can be found in [11, 41] . Then, let QA def = A, Q(2) def = A, and, finally, Q(1) def = 1. Finally, define Q to act component-wise on finite products (this will later guarantee that it becomes monoidal).
We also explain the action on 1-cells by example, rather than by tedium. Recall that we asked that substitution is definable internally. This amounts to the existence of a term of the theory, say sub(y, x), which represents the substitution function. That is, given the Gödel number φ of a predicate φ and the Gödel number t of a term t of the theory, it should be the case that
Now, given a predicate φ : A → 2 with one free variable, Q(φ) : A → A is defined to be the term sub( φ , x). Given a sentence φ : 1 → 2, we define Q(φ) : 1 → A to be exactly the closed term φ . The action is similar on 1-cells with codomain A, and componentwise on product arrows.
It is evident that 2-cells are reflected, for if α : Q(φ) ⇒ Q(ψ), then φ = ψ , so that φ = ψ, by the injectivity of the Gödel numbering.
In the particular example of PA, it is not very hard to see that a IFP for an arrow φ : Q(2) → 2 is exactly a ψ : 1 → 2 such that PA ⊢ ψ ↔ φ( ψ ), which is exactly the statement of the diagonal lemma (see Section 6) . Hence, the arguments of Section 6 directly apply.
We regard this approach as a refinement in comparison to Lawvere's. Lawvere obtained Tarski's theorem by spotting that a 'truth predicate' is exactly a weak-point surjection. Hence, if there were a truth predicate in the theory, there would be EFPs for the object 2, giving rise to inconsistency. From that, Gödel's theorem follows easily (see [25] ). We believe our approach to be more refined and shows more clearly what kind of machinery is required in each case.
There is one omission, and it is that we have not shown the diagonal lemma categorically. We have a partial solution, but it is not crisp at all: see the next section.
Conclusion
In summary, we have explained why bicategories allow us to model intensionality, and introduced a new notion, that of exposures, in order to make intensionality into a logical construct. In that framework, a number of known results can be stated and proved, abstracting away from the specifics of computability theory and/or "Gödel studies" in first-order logic.
Our contribution leaves a number of questions open. In the sequel we discuss a few research directions that we believe are interesting, starting from the small and technical, and moving towards the large and speculative.
Untypedness and The Diagonal Lemma
How can we lucidly express the diagonal lemma from Peano arithmetic in this context? After many unsuccessful attempts at it, the present author believes that the reason it is so difficult is that our exposure formalism is fundamentally typed. Arithmetic, on the other hand, is not: Q(2) has many more points than just 'all Gödel numbers of predicates.'
The type-respecting nature of our approach is what sets our work apart from previous attempts at capturing computability arguments abstractly. The most recent line of work in this include the very elegant approach of Cockett and Hofstra [13, 14] . Their approach is based on Turing categories, in which every object is a retract of some very special objects-the so-called Turing objects. The conclusion of [13] explicitly mentions this as an 'inherent limitation.' Only time will tell which approach is more encompassing.
Modal Type Theory & Safe Reflective Programming
As presented in this article, exposures are meant to be the categorical model of modal λ-calculi and type theories, with the box modality to be read as 'intension' or 'code.' The idea is that, as elements of box type are treated intensionally, we can model nonfunctional computation as functional. This seems to tremendously expand the expressive power of functional languages. What is the exact magnitude of this expansion? What are the possible applications of such expressiveness? How can we use it for theory, and what can we use it for in practice?
In terms of practical programming, we view our work as the foundation of the typed version of recent attempts to understand metaprogramming, and in particular reflective metaprogramming. Similar work has recently been conducted on the 'wild' metaprogramming facilities of languages such as JavaScript [27] , which sports a eval construct. How can we use the ideas in this paper for safe reflective typed programming?
Intensionality in Mathematics
Can we find examples of exposures in other contexts? The idea is that exposures are an abstract notion of 'Gödel numbering,' and so we should be able to find a multitude of logical examples. What about examples not originating from logic?
A simple example from homology comes to mind. Maps between homology groups are group homomophisms f * : G1/H1 → G2/H2, usually defined through some f : G1 → G2 such that f (H1) ⊆ H2. To prove that two such maps f * , g * : G1/H1 → G2/H2 are equal, it suffices to prove that they are pointwise homologous, i.e. that that f − g takes values only in H2. We could instead imagine that homology is valued in the bicategory of quotiented groups: objects are (G, H), where G is a group and H is a normal subgroup, representing the group G/H. 1-cells f : (G1, H1) → (G2, H2) are group homomorphisms f : G1 → G2 such that f (H1) ⊆ H2, and there is an invertible 2-cell between pointwise homologous 1-cells. An exposure, then, maps f : (G1, H1) → (G2, H2) to f : (G1, ∅) → (G2, ∅), exposing the 'implementation' of the map whilst disregarding the quotienting.
What is the use of the example from homology we just sketched, if there is any? Do the notions of exposure and intensionality in general have applications in any other areas of mathematics?
